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Abstract 
The emergence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has greatly influenced 
business communication. CSR reporting has become the main tool through which 
organisations worldwide communicate their economic, social and environmental 
performance. However, as this practice is consolidated, the need for credible 
information in this area is critical. As a result, some companies submit their CSR 
reports to an assurance process. Some authors have analysed CSR reporting and 
assurance among stock companies, but few studies develop a non-stock firm 
perspective. Given the shortage of prior research works, we have developed a 
pioneering study that analyses these practices focusing on cooperative and mutual 
organisations because, as social enterprises, they have a special link with CSR, as well 
as present another kind of firm implying different transaction costs. By combining 
statistical and content analysis methods, we aim to identify what determinants influence 
adoption of reporting and assurance, choice of assuror, and the quality of assurance 
statements. Findings reveal that size is positively but nonlinearly related with CSR 
reporting, country and sector significantly affects adoptions of CSR reporting and 
assurance. Assurance statements differ across providers and their quality depends on 
size, sector and assuror, exhibiting interactions between size and assuror and, on the 
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1. Introduction 
Public awareness of the role of corporations in society has increased over the last 
decades. Many of the firms that contributed to economic and technological progress 
have been criticised because of the social problems that they caused. Thus, there has 
been a growing attention and concern about issues such as pollution, waste, resource 
depletion, product quality and safety, the rights and status of workers, and the power of 
large corporations (Reverte 2009). As a consequence, there has been an increase in 
accountability pressures on companies and a growing demand for transparency about 
corporate behaviour (Kolk 2008). This situation has led companies to introduce the 
‘CSR’ concept into their business strategies. 
The irruption of this concept has intensely influenced corporate communication. 
Thus, CSR reporting has considerably increased and it has become the medium 
through which companies around the world communicate their economic, social and 
environmental performance (triple bottom line). CSR reports have been an essential 
communication tool between organisations and their stakeholders (Mori Junior et al. 
2014). According to KPMG (2015), 92% of Global 250 companies (G250: the top 250 
companies of the Fortune 500 Index) and 73% of National 100 companies (N100: the 
top 100 companies in 45 countries where KPMG operates) issue CSR report. The most 
commonly used standard to prepare this kind of reports is the GRI Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). It achieves widespread 
adoption with 74% of G250 companies and 72% of N100 companies (KPMG 2015). 
Despite the growth of CSR reporting, it is subject to concerns in terms of the 




this practice because it lacks accountability and transparency (Dando and Swift 2003; 
Adams and Evans 2004). According to Owen et al. (2000), enterprises disclose only 
appropriate information to gain corporate advantage, and a good reputation instead of 
looking for transparency and accountability for stakeholders. It has created the need for 
credible reported information in this area, known as the so-called ‘credibility gap’. As a 
result, some organisations submit their CSR reports to an assurance process carried 
out by independent experts in order to gain credibility on the reported information. 
According to Simnett (2012), the provision of external assurance on the content and 
structure of CSR reports improves their relevance, reliability and comparability and, 
therefore, enhances their overall credibility. KPMG (2015) revealed that 63% of G250 
companies and 42% of N100 companies use assurance as a strategy to verify and 
assess their corporate responsibility information. 
The outcome of the assurance process is an assurance report or statement which 
form and content differs depending on the assurance scope, the assurance standards 
and the assurance provider (GRI, 2013). The most relevant assurance standards are 
the AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) from AccountAbility, and the 
International Standard of Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of 
Historical Financial Information (ISAE 3000) from the IAASB. AA1000AS is an 
internationally accepted, freely available standard that provides requirements for 
conducting sustainability assurance, and it is based on the principles of inclusivity, 
materiality and responsiveness included in the AA1000 AccountAbility Principles 
Standard (AA1000APS) (AccountAbility 2008a, 2008b). ISAE 3000 is a generic 
standard that provides principles and procedures for accounting firms to follow when 
reviewing non-financial information (IAASB 2003, 2013). Neither standard is conflicting 
nor a substitute, but both are complementary as they provide comprehensive and 




Previous studies have analysed CSR reporting and assurance among stock 
companies. However, little effort has been made to develop a non-stock firm 
perspective. We focus on the special case of cooperative and mutual organisations, 
which identifies an interesting research gap in this area. As social entities, this kind of 
organisations have a significant link with CSR. According to Belhouari et al. (2005), 
CSR is not a challenge for cooperatives, it is “an integral part of their values and the 
dynamics with which they operate”. The triple bottom line is very present in cooperative 
organisations, so their values and principles completely assume this triple dimension 
(Puentes and Velasco 2009). 
On the other hand, cooperatives are a different kind of firm from property rights 
and agency theories. A firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979), the firm has contracts with stakeholders like its employees suppliers, 
customers, creditors, etc. To Fama and Jensen (1983) contracts which play a key role 
in any economic organization are ”those that specify 1) the nature of residual claims 
and 2) the allocation of decision process among the agents”. In short, all contracts, 
apart from those with the owners, set out fixed remunerations. At this point Hansmann 
(1996) states that the type of patron1 who owns the firm is that which minimizes the 
sum of total transaction costs for all type of patrons, where transactions costs include 
the cost of market contracting and costs of ownershsip. “A cooperative can be defined 
as an economic organization whose residual claims are restricted to the agent group 
that supplies patronage under the organization’s nexus of contracts (i.e. member-
patron) and whose board of directors is elected by the same group”. In other words, in 
cooperatives the shareholder has a dual role, one as capital provider and the another 
one as supplier, customer or worker. 
                                                     
1 Hansmann utilizes the term patron which can be taken as synonymous of stakeholder which contract 




This setting links interestingly with, in brief, two broad perspectives to CSR, the 
instrumental perspective and the normative perspective (Herrera Madueño et al., 
2016b). The normative perspective, concerned with the moral correctness of firms and 
their managers.The instrumental perspective, is related to the traditional performance 
goals of profitability and business growth, showing a relationship with conventional 
theories in economics and corporate strategy (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In other 
words, under this perspective, the firm should engage in CSR activities when doing so 
maximizes the shareholder value (Moser and Martín, 2012). 
Linking cooperatives and CSR raises interesting questions, Should cooperatives 
engage more in CSR activities given their social nature? Or , following a instrumental 
perspective, given their nature and dual role of the main stakeholders, so far it 
supposses less transactions costs, do cooperatives engages less in CSR activities? 
From a more operative point of view, Gallardo et al. (2015) considered necessary 
to analyse the situation of cooperatives in the CSR area, as it will be determinant to 
their CSR, and it will convey to obtain qualifying aspects of their position and image in 
the market, and to obtain better results. 
The aim of this paper is to shed light regarding CSR reporting and assurance 
practices among the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations. First, we identified 
what determinants have an impact on their decision to issue and to assure CSR 
reports, and to choose an assurance provider. Secondly, we analysed differences of 
assurance statements across providers. Finally, we evaluated the quality of assurance 
statements and we identified what determinants influence this quality. The result is a 
pioneering research work in CSR reporting and assurance, because there is a lack of 
studies in this area that focus on cooperative and mutual organisations. As motivated 
before, we think that CSR in cooperatives is an interesting setting and this paper could 




The paper is organised as follows. In the following section, we present a literature 
review that helps us to develop the research questions. Next, we describe the sample 
and the methodology. Afterwards, we expose the results of our analysis. Finally, we 
discuss the results and present our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and development of research questions 
2.1. Theoretical approach 
The research of CSR practices engages different theoretical perspectives. 
According to Smith et al. (2011), a framework for investigating CSR reporting and 
assurance should use a systems-oriented theory to position this practice into a social 
context. Systems-oriented theories offer a powerful lens (Gray et al. 1996) as it allows 
to introduce broader societal influences in analysing the way companies operate and 
the information they reveal (Deegan and Unerman 2006). The most widely used 
systems-oriented theories are legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theories 
(Reverte 2009; Hahn and Kühnen 2013; Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015). 
The idea of legitimacy theory is that businesses are bound by a ‘social contract’ in 
which the firms agree to perform several socially desired actions in return for approval 
of their objectives and other rewards, and this ultimately guarantees their survival. 
Thus, organisations issue CSR reports in order to legitimate their role within society 
(Deegan 2002), and assurance reinforces social behaviour by adding credibility to their 
reports (Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015). The assurance process and assurance 
statement generally have an important role in establishing legitimacy, especially 
regarding the key audience of the CSR report as well as the sustainability assurance 
services (O’Dwyer et al. 2011). From this approach, assurance is considered as a 
necessary tool for satisfying the social demands that ensure the survival of the firm in 
coalition with the objectives of the community in which it is located (Martínez-Ferrero 




Stakeholder theory understands companies as a part of a wider social system in 
which their commercial activities affect, and are affected by, other stakeholder groups 
within society (Freeman 1984; Deegan 2002). Thus, it is expected that stakeholders’ 
pressures influence the decision to adopt assurance (Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015; 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017), and the selection of assurance provider 
(Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015). 
Institutional theory seeks to explain how institutions adopt similar practices or 
structures in order to conform to external expectations and gain legitimacy and support 
(Deegan 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Institutional change takes place along 
three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coercive 
isomorphism describes how external determinants (e.g. government policy, regulation 
or commercial pressures) exert force on organisations to adopt specific internal 
structures and procedures. Mimetic isomorphism describes the process by which 
organisations copy the structures and procedures adopted by other organisations. 
Normative isomorphism is the process by which organisations adopt the structures and 
procedures advanced by particular dominant professions, professional bodies and/or 
consultants (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These three mechanisms push companies to 
be more transparent and socially and environmentally responsible (Amran and Haniffa, 
2011). 
According to Cormier et al. (2005), CSR reporting is a complex phenomenon that 
cannot be explained by one single theory. Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015) stated that 
legitimacy and stakeholder theories explain that differences on reporting and 
assurance may exist depending on company characteristics, while institutional theory 
may explain differences at the country level. Therefore, in accordance with Reverte 
(2009), we employed a multi-theoretical framework in order to explain the differences in 





2.2. Determinants on CSR reporting and assurance 
CSR reporting has attracted considerable attention from the academic community 
(Fifka and Drabble 2012), and most studies have investigated about determinants that 
influence this practice (Fifka 2013, Hahn and Kühnen 2013). Similarly, empirical 
research on CSR assurance has quickly increased with regards to the enhanced 
stakeholder information awareness (Velte and Stawinoga 2017), and the first area of 
interest includes studies which focus on determinants that influence the decision to 
adopt assurance (Hummel et al. 2017). 
Size 
From the legitimacy theory perspective, large companies have a higher political 
visibility, so they are expected to engage more heavily in legitimating behaviour 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Thus, it is assumed that large firms may be driven to make 
CSR disclosures to demonstrate that their actions are legitimate and to enhance 
corporate reputation (Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Castelo and Lima 2008). From the 
institutional theory perspective, activities of large companies are of interest to different 
stakeholders, and as such they tend to provide leadership in CSR reporting practices, 
or to mimic their competitors’ practices so as not to lose their market share (Amran and 
Haniffa 2011). 
Empirical results widely support this thinking (Hahn and Kühnen 2013). Hackston 
and Milne (1996) focused on New Zealand companies, and found that larger 
companies revealed more social and environmental information. Using a sample of 150 
reports from six European countries, Adams et al. (1998) identified a positive 
association between the reported information and the company size. Archel (2003) 
focused on Spanish companies, and showed that the largest ones were more involved 




Exchange, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) found that large companies made more social 
disclosures for reasons of accountability and visibility. With a sample of companies 
listed on the FTSE All-Share Index (the broadest index of UK listed stocks), Brammer 
and Pavelin (2008) observed that larger companies were significantly more likely to 
make voluntary disclosures. Kent and Monem (2008) analysed Australian companies, 
and evidenced that size was significant in explaining adoption of CSR reporting. 
Drawing on a sample of companies listed on the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
(Euronext – Lisbon), Castelo and Lima (2008) found a positive association between 
size and CSR reporting. Focusing on Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange and included in the IBEX-35 index, Reverte (2009) revealed that those with 
higher CSR ratings presented a statistically significant larger size. Taking the 
companies listed in the Bursa Malaysia, Amran and Haniffa (2011) proved that size 
significantly contributed to CSR. Thorne et al. (2014) focused on Canadian companies, 
and showed that reporting was more common among large firms, since these have 
more political visibility and are subject to greater external scrutiny. Using a sample of 
companies included in the Forbes Global 2000, García-Sánchez et al. (2015) found 
that size had a significant positive effect on CSR reporting. Focusing in SMEs, Herrera 
Madueño et al. (2016a) found that size is a contributing factor to SMEs engages in 
CSR activities. Drawing on a sample of 2113 companies from 31 countries, Simnett et 
al. (2009) indicated that large companies were more likely to produce CSR reports, 
adopt assurance and choose large accounting firms as assurance providers. Taking 
the companies listed in the Spanish capital market from the Bolsa de Madrid, Zorio et 
al. (2013) underlined that size influenced positively adoption of CSR reporting and 
assurance. However, they found no association with choice of assuror. Kolk and 
Perego (2010) studied the behaviour of the G250 companies, and revealed that size 
was not significantly associated with the decision to have a CSR report assured. 




auditing profession instead of other assurance providers, suggesting thus that the 
likelihood of choosing large accounting firms as assurors increased for large 
companies. Focusing on the IBEX-35 companies, Sierra et al. (2013) highlighted that 
the decision to adopt assurance was positively associated with size. Sierra et al. (2014) 
paid attention to Latin American companies, and revealed that assurance was more 
common among large companies. With a sample of Portuguese firms, Castelo et al. 
(2014) indicated that as size increased, companies were more likely to assure their 
CSR reports. Cho et al. (2014) took some companies included in the Fortune 500, and 
found no association between size and adoption of assurance. Using the GRI 
database, Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015) reaffirmed that size influenced the probability 
of adopting assurance and choosing Big-4 firms as assurors. Gillet (2015) examined 
the companies listed on the French SBF 120, and found that size positively influenced 
adoption of assurance. By a sample of companies listed in the Forbes Global 2000, 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) showed that larger companies are more 
visible and more susceptible to public scrutiny and institutional pressures to adopt 
assurance systems. 
Country-related determinants 
From the institutional theory perspective, Campbell (2007) argued that companies 
are more likely to act in socially responsible ways if there are strong and well-enforced 
state regulations in place to ensure such behaviour. García-Sánchez et al. (2015) and 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) discussed that CSR reporting and 
assurance act as a legitimization tool in response to normative and coercive pressures. 
Regarding coercive isomorphism, researchers have investigated legal systems and 
enforcement mechanisms. Several authors stated that the legal system is a key 
determinant of the level of stakeholder orientation (García-Sánchez et al. 2015). In this 




common law countries are more oriented to shareholders (Ball et al. 2000; La Porta et 
al. 1997). A wide range of stakeholders engages a high demand for CSR reporting and 
assurance (Velte and Stawinoga 2017). Thus, it is expected that the likelihood of 
adopting CSR reporting and assurance is higher for companies domiciled in civil law 
countries (García-Sánchez et al. 2015; Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017). 
As regards the enforcement mechanisms, it is expected that companies operating in 
countries with a strong legal enforcement aimed at the protection of stakeholders are 
more likely to issue and assure CSR reports (García-Sánchez et al. 2015; Martínez-
Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017; Velte and Stawinoga 2017). As regards normative 
isomorphism, García-Sánchez et al. (2015) argued that the cultural affinity of 
sustainability determines stakeholders’ expectations for companies, generating a 
propensity in firms to adopt sustainable behaviour and improve their transparency in 
this sphere in order to obtain social legitimacy. Accordingly, it can be expected that 
firms located in societies with a cultural system more oriented to stakeholders are more 
strongly involved in CSR issues, favouring the transparency of CSR disclosures. 
Moreover, it is expected that adoption of assurance is positively associated with 
normative pressures based on the cultural development of countries where companies 
operate. That is, that companies show a greater likelihood of assuring CSR reports and 
have a greater sustainability commitment in societies more culturally developed 
(Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017). 
From an empirical perspective, Adams et al. (1998) identified differences on the 
reported information across countries. García-Sánchez et al. (2015) found that cultural 
dimensions exerted important pressures on firms, improving the transparency. They 
also evidenced that firms located in civil law countries showed greater interest in 
disclosing standardised CSR information. Simnett et al. (2009) indicated that 




environments were more likely to produce CSR reports, adopt assurance and choose 
large accounting firms as assurance providers. Kolk and Perego (2010) revealed that 
the likelihood of adopting assurance was higher for companies domiciled in countries 
more oriented to stakeholders and with a weaker governance enforcement regime. On 
the other hand, the likelihood of choosing large accounting firms as assurors was 
higher for companies located in shareholder-oriented countries. Fernández-Feijóo et al. 
(2015) did not find that the legal system of the country significantly affected these 
decisions. However, they showed that regulatory actions, such as those proposed by 
the EU Commission, had a great effect on the likelihood of assuring a CSR report. 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) revealed that companies from countries 
with a greater legal system and cultural development were more likely to assure their 
CSR reports. 
Sector 
Adopting the legitimacy theory, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) supposed that the 
influence of sector on reporting depends on how critical the effects of companies’ 
economic activities impacted on society. Companies with high social and/or 
environmental impacts are more visible to the public. Consequently, they have a 
greater need to demonstrate that they are socially responsible and legitimise their role 
in society (Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015). According to stakeholder theory, Sweeney 
and Coughlan (2008) suggested that firms operating in different sectors should focus 
on certain stakeholders more than they should focus on others. So, firms in different 
sectors report on CSR consistent with what their key stakeholders expect. Moreover, 
firms in different sectors assure their CSR reports according to the main stakeholders’ 
pressures (Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017). From the institutional theory 
perspective, Campbell (2007) argued that sectors establish their own regulatory 




setting standards to which their members are expected to adhere. Hence, companies 
are more likely to act in socially responsible ways if there is a system of well-organised 
and effective industrial self-regulation in place to ensure such behaviour. In line with 
mimetic isomorphism, Amran and Haniffa (2011) supposed that competition may cause 
companies of one sector to adopt the strategies and practices of those perceived as 
more successful. Similarly, some sectors are more sensitive to external demands and 
have high political costs, and as such companies would emulate sector norms as a 
legitimation strategy. Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) argued that 
assurance acts as a legitimization tool in response to mimetic pressures. Thus, 
companies could adopt assurance to resemble or mimic the behaviour of competitors, 
especially the leaders in their sector. 
Empirically, Hackston and Milne (1996) evidenced that companies operating in 
sectors with a high consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated 
intense competition, revealed more social and environmental information. Adams et al. 
(1998) identified differences on the reported information across sectors. Archel (2003) 
found that companies operating in ‘sensitive sectors’ were more involved in CSR 
reporting. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) provided support for an association between 
disclosure and an activity’s perceived proximity to highly visible environmental issues. 
Castelo and Lima (2008) suggested that concern for community involvement activities 
and disclosure was greater in sectors with a high visibility among consumers. Reverte 
(2009) evidenced that firms with higher CSR ratings belonged to more ‘environmentally 
sensitive sectors’. Amran and Haniffa (2011) proved that the field coercion created due 
to the formal and informal interaction had increased CSR reporting for plantations and 
mining sectors. García-Sánchez et al. (2015) suggested that sectors with lower 
sustainability orientation promoted levels of transparency. On the other hand, Haniffa 




less significant, suggesting that companies did not adopt legitimation strategies to 
address specific concerns relating to core economic activities in their sector grouping. 
Simnett et al. (2009) indicated that companies operating in mining, production, utilities 
or finance sectors were more likely to produce CSR reports. They also found that 
adoption of assurance was more common among companies engaging in more highly 
visible industrial activity or with a larger ‘social footprint’. Zorio et al. (2013) underlined 
sector as a determinant of adopting CSR reporting and assurance, and hiring an 
assurance provider. Specifically, they found that basic materials and construction, oil 
and energy, and consumer services sectors were more likely to issue CSR reports. 
Whereas, companies operating in basic materials and construction, oil and energy, and 
technology and telecommunication sectors were more prone to assure their CSR 
reports. Consumer services was the only sector significantly associated with hiring an 
auditor as assuror. Sierra et al. (2013) noticed that companies from oil and energy, 
basic materials, and financial services sectors significantly tended to hire auditors as 
assurance providers. Cho et al. (2014) found that those from the financial sector or 
‘environmentally sensitive sectors’ were more likely to seek external assurance. 
Castelo et al. (2014) indicated that sector affiliation was a determinant of assurance. 
They presented evidence that companies from utilities, financials, technology and 
telecommunications, and oil and basic materials sectors were more likely to adopt 
assurance. In contrast, the construction and materials sector was lagging behind the 
other sectors. Sierra et al. (2014) revealed that assurance was more common among 
companies from ‘sensitive sectors’. Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015) affirmed that sector 
influenced the probability of adopting assurance and choosing Big-4 firms as assurors. 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) showed that companies operating in 





2.3. Content and quality of assurance statements 
The second and third areas of research in CSR assurance comprise studies that 
analyse assurance statements in depth, and associations between the content and 
disclosure of assurance statement items and assurance providers, respectively 
(Hummel et al. 2017). 
In this way, O'Dwyer and Owen (2005) drew on a sample of firms short-listed for 
the 2002 ACCA Sustainability Reporting Awards. They found that all their assurance 
statements referred to the assurance scope. They noted that assurors from the 
accounting profession were more likely than consultants to indicate the level of 
assurance. However, consultants provided higher levels of assurance than 
accountants. On the other hand, the likelihood of mentioning assurance standards was 
higher for consultants, who were the forerunners in the use of AA1000AS. Conversely, 
the criteria used by accountants were generally stated as reflecting emerging best 
practice together with the underlying principles within international standards. Hasan et 
al. (2005) conducted a survey of accounting firms, and noticed that many of the 
assurance services provided a limited/moderate level of assurance rather than a 
reasonable/high level. Deegan et al. (2006a, b) focused on Australian and European 
and UK assurance statements, respectively, and showed a great variability in their 
contents. For example, most assurance statements did not mentioned addressees, and 
among those that nominated them, addressees were internal to the reporting 
organisation, instead of being external stakeholders. Whilst in the UK, the majority of 
assurance statements indicated that reporting organisations are responsible for the 
contents of CSR reports and assurance providers are responsible for the contents of 
assurance statements, it was unusual in the European and Australian contexts. In all 
regions, most assurance statements failed to identify any reporting criteria. On the 




performed. In the European context, most statements mentioned standards, while the 
contrary happened in the UK and Australia. Moreover, opposite to European assurance 
providers, most UK and Australian providers noted areas for improvement. 
Furthermore, their results also showed differences in the assurance statements 
produced by different types of assurance providers. For instance, accounting firms 
were more likely to identify an addressee, mention responsibilities of reporting 
organisations, and, identify assurance standards. Mock et al. (2007, 2013) took a 
sample of firms from different countries, that issued sustainability reports for the 
periods 2002-2004 and 2006-2007, respectively. Their results revealed that the type of 
provider was significantly associated with the level of assurance, being Big-4 firms 
more likely to provide a lower level of assurance, unlike other types of providers. They 
also showed that Big-4 firms were more likely to specify the standard used, tending to 
employ international standards (such as the ISAE 3000) and national or local 
standards, while other providers were more inclined to the AA1000AS. On the other 
hand, they noted that Big-4 firms were less likely to include recommendations in their 
assurance statements. Taking some assurance statements from the GRI Database, 
Manetti and Becatti (2009) found that ISAE 3000 was the most used standard, followed 
by a combination of the ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS. Most assurance statements 
referred to a limited/moderate level. All the assurance statements indicated the 
procedures followed. Reporting criteria were mentioned in most cases. On the other 
hand, the materiality assessment implied the consultation of stakeholders in a minority 
of statements, while in the other ones, the materiality was evaluated by the assurance 
provider through the analysis of the steps taken regarding the identification and 
consideration of the corporate stakeholders. They also noted that auditors often 
provided recommendations for further improvements. Likewise, Manetti and Toccafondi 
(2012) found that almost all statements specified the standards. Specifically, the most 




3000, the AA1000AS, and other national or international standards. Only accountants 
used ISAE 3000, while consultants showed a preference for AA1000AS or other 
national or international standards. Combination of standards was more likely among 
accountants, and the prevailing combination was of ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS. Most 
statements stated the level of assurance, being more frequent the limited/moderate 
level. Addressees were identified in the majority of cases, although assurors mostly 
addressed to managers. In the majority of cases, assurance statements included 
indications for improvements, which was more common among consultants than 
among accountants. Most assurance statements did not declare verification of 
relevance and materiality. A minority of statements mentioned verification of 
stakeholder engagement by organisations. On the other hand, the majority of them 
referred explicitly to stakeholder engagement during the assurance process by 
assurors. Perego and Kolk (2012) analysed assurance practices among the G250 
firms. They found that the most usual adoption of standards consisted in combining the 
GRI guidelines with AA1000AS or ISAE3000. But, they also noted that a large number 
of assurance processes do not formally obey to any standard. By type of provider, they 
indicated that accounting firms employed mainly the ISAE 3000, while specialists and 
certification bodies tended to use the AA1000AS. They also showed a lack of 
transparency in the assurance process with regard to reporting on completeness and 
responsiveness. Furthermore, they evidenced that the quality of assurance was highly 
dependent upon the type of provider. Accounting firms and certification bodies provided 
higher quality with respect to items concerning the reporting format and procedures. In 
opposition, specialists and certification bodies tended to be more elaborate and 
informative when it came to formulate a recommendation. Likewise, Perego (2009), 
who drew on a sample of assurance statements of firms short-listed for the 2005 ACCA 
Sustainability Reporting Awards, provided evidence that Big-4 firms positively affected 




the quality of the recommendations and opinions was positively associated with non-
accounting providers. In the same way, Zorio et al. (2013), Fernández-Feijóo et al. 
(2012) and Romero et al. (2010) analysed assurance among Spanish companies and 
indicated that quality was significantly higher when the assurance provider was an 
auditor. 
Furthermore, other investigations have studied the users’ perception of assurance 
statements. Roebuck et al. (2000) showed that shareholders were unable to infer a 
level of assurance on the basis of the description of work performed, but they reacted 
to the nature of the engagement and perceived a higher assurance for the report 
relating to historical information as opposed to that relating to prospective information. 
Hasan et al. (2003) suggested that users perceived a moderate level assurance report 
to provide less assurance than a high level assurance report, except when it was 
accompanied by an opinion on procedures. Their findings also indicated that a report 
with an opinion stated in a positive form was seen to provide a higher level of 
assurance than that stated in the negative form. Similarly, Schelluch and Gay (2006) 
showed a greater reliability on the positively worded assurance statement than on the 
negatively worded assurance statement. In addition, those receiving the positively 
worded assurance statement viewed responsibilities of auditors to be higher than those 
receiving a negatively worded assurance statement. Hodge et al. (2009) noted that 
users felt more confident about sustainability reports where the assurance level was 
reasonable/high, and when the assurance provider was a big accounting firm. Pflugrath 
et al. (2011) noted that financial analysts in the USA gave more credibility to the 
sustainability assurance undertaken by accountants as opposed to non-accountants. 
 




CSR implies an enterprise approach in which a company’s strategic objective 
extends to pursue value for all stakeholders. This approach is not new for cooperative 
societies because, as the literature indicates, it is a model that is intrinsic to their 
nature. The pivotal role of partners in cooperative societies (shareholders, customers, 
suppliers, employees, etc.) implies that they assume different roles as stakeholders to 
facilitate CSR development, which have the ability to integrate their own needs and to 
establish solid relationships with them based on participation (Vargas and Vaca 2005). 
The communication from the Commission of the European Communities (2002) 
concerning CSR indicates that ‘cooperatives, mutuals and associations as 
membership-led organisations have a long tradition in combining economic viability 
with social responsibility. They ensure this through stakeholder dialogue and 
participative management and thus can provide an important reference to other 
organisations’. 
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as ‘an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise’ (ICA, 1995). This definition is a first approach to cooperatives’ 
socially responsible behaviour (Server and Capó 2009, 2011), where we can see some 
CSR-related matters. But the cooperative values (self-help, self-responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity and solidarity) show more clearly the relationship between 
CSR and the cooperative movement (Carrasco 2007). These values summarise in 
seven principles that, as shown in Table 1, have a relationship with CSR principles 
stated by the European Commission (Server and Capó 2009, 2011). 
Table 1 
 
Dale et al. (2013) also demonstrated that there is a theoretical relationship 




dimensions of CSR. In particular, the relationship with the social dimensions is very 
strong. Belhouari et al. (2005) argued that the internalization of CSR by cooperatives is 
based on both specific values and principles, as in the business configuration. 
Monitoring of cooperative principles leads cooperative organisations to carry out their 
activities with the aim of meeting the needs and concerns of its members and other 
stakeholders, such as the local community, employees, suppliers and customers, other 
cooperatives, and society in general. Their nature makes them to develop their 
business in a responsible manner, contributing to the development of the community or 
location where they are installed, without compromising their economic viability 
(Puentes and Velasco 2009). Hence, the compromise of cooperatives with the 
community, workers and the environment, since it affirms compromise with CSR, is 
clear (Carrasco 2007). 
Definitely, CSR shares numerous common points with cooperative values and 
principles (Server and Capó 2009, 2011), and therefore constitutes an inherent 
ideology of cooperatives (Mozas and Puentes 2010). 
The Commission of the European Communities (2012) stated that the long-term 
goal of cooperatives is achieving economic and social sustainability through 
empowering people, anticipating changes and optimizing the use of resources. It 
encourages, therefore, the involvement of cooperatives in the paradigm of CSR (Heras 
and Arana 2013), because they have a road travelled in this area, which places them in 
a better strategic position (Collado 2006). 
Despite their theoretical advantage, there is little evidence about their CSR-related 
actions. In general, cooperative societies are not recognised with regards to design and 
implementation of CSR-related initiatives (Castilla and Gallardo, 2014). 
According to Herbert et al. (2016), little effort was invested in developing CSR 




cooperatives. Some organisations and scholars have developed specific tools for 
cooperatives and other social enterprises. For instance, in 1998, ICA-Americas 
proposed the Balance Social Cooperativo (Cooperative Social Audit) to stablish a 
general model to cooperatives. In 2007, CEPES created the RSE.COOP project, a tool 
of CSR for the social economy. The Basque Country Federation of Educational 
Cooperatives, in collaboration with a research team from the Institute of Cooperative 
Studies of the University of Deusto, worked on a CSR report model adapted to the 
particular circumstances of cooperatives in the education sector (Mugarra, 2005). 
Pérez y Gargallo (2005) formed a specific model, based on the characteristics of Social 
Balance, that came up to expectations about fulfilling CSR of cooperatives. They also 
put forward several stages of the model that were necessary to implement a plan of 
action involving stakeholders in the process. Quarter et al. (2007) outlined how 
cooperatives could account for indicators of a more social nature. Other tools, indexes, 
indicators and procedures are the Cooperative Sustainability and Planning Scorecard 
(Brown et al, 2015), the Cooperative Sustainability Scorecard (Christianson, 2015) and 
the Coop Index (Hough, 2015). 
Despite these tools, cooperatives have showed over the last years an increasing 
interest with regards to the use of international standards, and specifically, to the use of 
GRI guidelines (Castilla and Gallardo, 2014). Duguid (2015) studied social and 
environmental indicators and tools that the top 50 worldwide cooperatives used. 
Results revealed that cooperatives did not use any sort of CSR reporting tool or they 
used the same indexes that investor-owned companies, such as GRI guidelines. 
Focusing on the use of this standard, Bollas-Araya et al. (2016) revealed that among 
the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations, few of them prepared their CSR 
reports following GRI guidelines. Castilla et al. (2015) evidenced that very few Spanish 
cooperatives used this standard to prepare their CSR reports. Bollas-Araya et al. 




banks. They found a low number of cooperative banks following GRI guidelines to 
prepare their reports. 
Gallardo et al. (2015) suggested a theoretical framework and a methodological 
proposal for qualitative validation of a model explaining CSR in cooperative societies.  
Meanwhile, two previous works focused on determinants explaining adoption of CSR 
reporting and assurance among the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations. 
Bollas-Araya et al. (2016) indicated that adoption of CSR reporting and choice of 
assuror were associated with the country and sector where organisations performed 
their activities, while adoption of assurance was only associated with country. However, 
Seguí-Mas et al. (2015) found that neither country nor sector were associated with 
adoption of assurance, although they were associated with choice of assuror. They 
also analysed the content of assurance statements. All assurance statements included 
the title, reporting criteria and conclusions. In the majority of cases, conclusions 
consisted of a general conclusion expressing the opinion of the assuror, while the 
minority consisted of a detailed conclusion. Most assurance statements referred to 
responsibilities of reporters and assurors, summarised the work undertaken and 
clarified the assurance scope. Most assurors declared the level of assurance, specially 
the limited/moderate level. Focusing on standards, most providers followed the ISAE 
3000, the AA1000AS, the GRI guidelines or a combination of them to apply the 
assurance process. Around half of assurors referred to their independence from the 
reporting organisation, their impartiality towards stakeholders and their competences. 
On the other hand, results evidenced few references to materiality, inclusivity of 
stakeholders and completeness. Some assurance statements included observations or 





The present paper goes further by analysing new determinants that could influence 
adoption of CSR reporting and assurance, and choice of assuror. Moreover, we study 
whether the content of assurance statements differs across assurors. Finally, we 
assess the quality of assurance statements, and we analyse what determinants 
influence this quality. In this line and based on the previous literature, we put forward 
the following research questions: 
RQ1: Is adoption of CSR reporting associated with organisation size, country and 
sector in the case of the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations?  
RQ2: Is adoption of assurance associated with organisation size, country and 
sector in the case of the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations?  
RQ3: Is choice of assurance provider associated with organisation size, country 
and sector in the case of the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations? 
RQ4: Are items contained in assurance statements associated with type of assuror 
in the case of the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations? 
RQ5: Is the quality of assurance statements associated with organisation size, 
country, sector and type of assuror in the case of the top 300 cooperative and 
mutual organisations? 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Methodology 
As we mentioned before, the first aim of this research work consist of verifying 
whether the determinants size, country and sector had an impact on the decision of 
cooperative and mutual organisations to issue and to assure CSR reports, and to 
choose an assurance provider. To achieve this purpose, we defined the next 
regression logistic models: 




ASSURANCE = F (SIZE, COUNTRY, SECTOR) 
ASSUROR = F (SIZE, COUNTRY, SECTOR) 
The second aim of this paper consist of analysing the content of assurance 
statements and determining differences across assurors. With this aim, we performed a 
content analysis. Following other authors (e.g., O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Perego and 
Kolk 2012; Zorio et al. 2013), we analysed the content of the assurance statements to 
check if they included the items required by the AA1000AS and ISAE 3000. For this, 
we built a codebook (see Appendix) that measures the quality of assurance 
statements. As can be derived from the codebook, the possible range of scores is 0 to 
26, whereby 0 represents the lowest quality level and 26 the highest quality level. In 
order to ensure reliability in the content analysis, we followed Neuendorf’s guidelines 
(2002). The coding procedure involved a team of two coders formed by the authors of 
the paper. We drew a random subsample of 5 assurance statements (10% of sample) 
and we analysed their content separately. The level of agreement between the coders 
(PA0 = A / n, where PA0 is the percentage of agreement observed, A represents the 
number of agreements between two coders, and n is the number of units of the 
sample) was 100% for all items. Then, we analysed the remaining statements. Next, 
we used cross-tabulation analysis and we tested associations by means of the Chi-
square tests. 
Finally, our third aim consist of assessing the quality of assurance statements and 
determining whether it depends on size, country, sector and assuror. Accordingly, we 
formulated the next multiple regression model: 
QUALITY = F (SIZE, COUNTRY, SECTOR, ASSUROR) 
 




According to our aims, and based on previous literature, we defined the next 
variables: 
‒ GRI report. It is a dummy variable that indicates whether an organisation adopts 
sustainability reporting following GRI guidelines. It takes a value of ‘0’ when the 
organisation does not issue a sustainability report or if it does not follow GRI 
guidelines and a value of ‘1’ when the organisation issues a GRI-based report. 
‒ Assurance. It is a dummy variable that indicates whether an organisation adopts 
external assurance. It takes a value of ‘0’ if the organisation is a non-adopter, and 
‘1’ if it is an adopter. 
‒ Assuror. It is a dummy variable that indicates the type of firm that provides external 
assurance. It takes a value of ‘0’ if the assurance provider does not belong to the 
accounting profession and a value of ‘1’ when the assurance provider is an 
accountant. 
‒ Quality. It is a continuous variable that indicates the quality of an assurance 
statement. It can take a value between ‘0’ and ‘26’, according to the codebook 
defined in Appendix. 
‒ Size. It is a continuous variable measured as the natural logaritm (Ln) of turnover 
(in billion dollars). 
‒ Country. Following Simnett et al. (2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010), it is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether an organisation is domiciled in a common 
law country, where companies have a more shareholder-oriented corporate 
governance model, or in a civil law country, where companies have a more 
stakeholder-oriented model (Ball et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1997). It takes a value 
of ‘0’ if the country is oriented to shareholders and a value of ‘1’ if it is oriented to 
stakeholders. 
‒ Sector. Following Sierra et al. (2014) and Reverte (2009), it is a dummy variable 




environmental impact. It takes a value of ‘0’ if the sector is less sensitive and a 
value of ‘1’ if it is more sensitive. 
 
3.3. Data collection and sample description 
For this research we had recourse to the World Co-operative Monitor, a project of 
the ICA, launched in 2012, with the scientific support of the European Research 
Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises (Euricse). The annual edition of this 
project collects annual data about the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations 
worldwide. Thus, we analysed 300 organisations from 28 countries and eight economic 
sectors for a four-year period (2010-2013), which made 1200 observations. 
Secondly, we employed the GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database to check what 
organisations disclosed a GRI report, that is, any form of sustainability report based on 
the GRI Guidelines. However, the GRI Database also includes other forms of 
sustainability and integrated reports, which it classifies as ‘Non-GRI’ and ‘GRI-
Referenced’ reports. Therefore, we selected only those reports that followed guidelines 
G3, G3.1 or G4 and we excluded the other ones. Then, we checked if these reports 
included an assurance statement. As a result, we found 96 GRI reports, of which 52 
were assured. 
As shown in Table 2, the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations reported 
an average turnover above 7 billion dollars over the period 2010-2013. The panel 
comprised mostly organisations from the United States (26.8%), France (13.3%) and 
Germany (11.3%). By sector level, most organisations operated in the insurance 
(41.1%), agriculture and food (28.2%), and wholesale and retail (20%) sectors. 
Regarding trends in CSR reporting, the percentage of top cooperative and mutual 
organisations that issued a GRI report in 2010 was 8.3%. It decreased to 7.3% in 2011, 
increased to 9% in 2012, and again went down to 7.3% in 2013. It is revealed that the 




2010 and 2013. The publication of GRI reports was more frequent in the Netherlands 
(25%) and Germany (12.5%). The most active sectors, in this regard, were agriculture 
and food (33.3%) and insurance (30.2%) sectors. Data also indicate an increasing 
trend in assurance. In 2010, the percentage of assured reports was 40%, and it 
increased to 54.5% in 2011, 59.3% in 2012 and 63.6% in 2013. The average level of 
turnover among assurance adopters was next to 12 billion dollars. Adoption of 
assurance was more common in the Netherlands (25%), Spain (15.4%) and Germany 
(13.5%). By sector, the insurance organisations occupied the first position (38.5%), and 




4.1. Determinants on CSR reporting and assurance 
Results in Table 3 reveal that only 8% of the cooperative and mutual organisations 
included in the sample issued CSR reports following GRI guidelines between 2010 and 
2103, while the majority (92%) did not issue CSR reports or did not follow GRI 
guidelines. The average turnover is higher for organisations that adopt CSR reporting. 
At country-level, the percentage of GRI-based reports is higher for stakeholder-oriented 
countries (11%) than for shareholders-oriented countries (3.1%). At sector level, the 
percentage of GRI-based reports is higher for more sensitive sectors (11%) than for 
less sensitive sectors (6.2%). With regard to adoption of assurance, results show that 
54.2% of CSR reports were submitted to an assurance process. The average turnover 
is higher for organisations that adopt assurance. At country-level, the percentage of 
assured reports is higher for stakeholder-oriented countries (58.5%) than for 
shareholder-oriented countries (28.6%). At sector-level, the percentage of assured 
reports is higher for less sensitive sectors (65.2%) than for more sensitive sectors 




services, while non-accountants carried out 32.7%. The average turnover is higher 
among organisations that choose accountants than among those that prefer non-
accountants. At country-level, non-accountants undertook all assurance services in 
shareholder-oriented countries. In stakeholder-oriented countries, accountants 
performed most assurance services (72.9%). At sector-level, accountants undertook 
73.3% of assurance services in less sensitive sectors, compared to 59.1% in more 
sensitive sectors. On the other hand, non-accountants carried out 26.7% of assurance 
services in less sensitive sectors, in comparison to 40.9% in more sensitive sectors. 
Table 3 
 
As shown in Table 4, the logistic regression model to explain what determinants 
are associated with CSR reporting is significant (p < 0.01). The R-square Nagelkerke2 
shows that the model explains 11.8% of the variability indicating a moderate 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. 
Nevertheless, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not significant (p > 0.05), which 
means that there is no statistical difference between estimated values and real values, 
confirming the goodness of fit of our model. In addition, we performed an analysis of 
the efficacy or classification accuracy of the model. Using a cut point of 0.5, the model 
presents an overall accuracy of the model of 92%, a specificity of 100%, that is to say, 
it classifies correctly the 100% when the cooperative does not issue a CSR report. In 
contrast, the model has a null sensitivity, it classifies correctly the 0% when the 
cooperative issues a CSR report. These extreme values of specificity and sensitivity 
are due to the unbalanced population, only the 8% of the cooperatives issue a CSR 
report. Using a cut point of 0.15, the overall accuracy is lower (82.97%), the specificity 
is lower (86.39%), but the sensitivity is higher (43.75%). 
                                                     
2 We only comment the Nagelkerke R-square of, since the Nagelkerke R-square introduces a correction on the upper 




A more complete description of classification accuracy is given by the area under 
the ROC (Received Operating Characteristic) curve, the resulting area under the ROC 
curve (0.755 > 0.7) is indicative of an acceptable discrimination (Hosmer et al., 2013).   
Results show that CSR reporting is significantly and positively associated with size (p < 
0.01), in addition, the square of size (logarithm of turnover) is significant and negative, 
this means that the relationship is non-linear and the positive relationship is 
decreasing. Country has also a significant effect (p < 0.01), with organisations located 
in stakeholder-oriented countries more likely to adopt this practice than those placed in 
shareholder-oriented countries. In the same way, CSR reporting is significantly 
associated with sector (p < 0.01), so that organisations that perform their activity in 




As presented in Table 5, the logistic regression model to explain what 
determinants are associated with assurance is significant (p < 0.01). The R-square 
Nagelkerke shows that the model explains 16.1% of the variability, indicating a 
moderate relationship. Nonetheless, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not significant 
(p > 0.05), which confirms the goodness of fit of our model. The model correctly 
classifies 63.5% of cases, presenting a specificity of 75.55% and a sensitivity of 50%. 
The area under the ROC curve (0.6823 < 0.7) indicates a discrimination close to 
acceptable. Results reveal that assurance is not significantly associated with size (p > 
0.10). On the other hand, country has a significant effect on assurance (p < 0.01), so 
that organisations domiciled in stakeholders-oriented countries are more likely to 
assure their CSR reports than those from shareholders-oriented countries. In the same 




that perform their activity in more sensitive sectors are less likely to adopt assurance 
than those from less sensitive sectors. 
Table 5 
 
As illustrated in Table 6, the logistic regression model to explain what determinants 
are associated with choice of assuror is significant (p < 0.01). The R-square 
Nagelkerke shows that the model explains 50.2% of variability, indicating an 
intermediate relationship. Moreover, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not significant 
(p > 0.05), which confirms the goodness of fit of our model. Regarding the classification 
accuracy, the model appropriately classifies 76.9% of cases, presents a specificity of 
52.94% and a sensitivity of 88.57%. The area under the ROC curve (0.884 > 0.8) 
indicates an excellent discrimination. Results indicate that choice of accountants as 
assurance providers is significantly and positively associated with size (p < 0.05). 
Conversely, neither country nor sector are significantly associated with choice of 
assuror (p > 0.10). 
Table 6 
 
4.2. Content of assurance statements 
As summarised in Table 7, all assurance statements contain the general items 
(title, name of provider and date). Location of assuror appears in 30.6% of statements 
and is more frequent among non-accounting providers (40%) than among accountants 
(26.5%). However, these differences are not significantly associated with the type of 
provider (p > 0.10). Addressee appears in 73.5% of statements and is more common 
among accountants (97.1%) than among non-accountants (20%). These differences 
involve a significant association to the type of provider (p < 0.01), with accounting 
providers being more likely than other providers to identify addressee. Moreover, all 




readers, while most of non-accountants (66.7%) address to stakeholders. So, there is a 
significant association between the type of provider and addressee (p < 0.01), with 
accounting providers more oriented to shareholders and non-accounting providers 
more oriented to stakeholders. Responsibilities of reporter and assuror are defined in 
87.8% and 91.8% of assurance statements, respectively. Specifically, 94.1% of 
accountants and 73.3% of non-accountants define responsibilities of reporter, while all 
accountants and 73.3% of non-accountants define responsibilities of assuror. In this 
line, we found that definition of responsibilities is significantly associated with type of 
provider (p < 0.10 and p < 0.01), in the way as accountants are more likely to specify 
them. Most of providers also declare their independence from the reporting 
organisation (71.4%) and their impartiality towards stakeholders (67.3%). Specifically, 
70.6% of accounting providers include a reference to these items or refer to an ethic 
code (such as the IESBA code), while non-accounting providers refer to independence 
in 73.3% of cases and to impartiality in 60% of cases. However, these items do not 
present significant differences (p > 0.10). References to competences of providers 
appear in 55.1% of assurance statements, being more frequent among non-
accountants (66.7%) than among accountants (50%). But, these differences do not 
involve a significant association to the type of provider (p > 0.10). On the other hand, 
91.8% of assurors summarise the work undertaken and refer to the scope of the 
assurance engagement, specifically, all accountants and 73.3% of non-accountants. 
These differences are significantly associated with the type of provider (p < 0.01), with 
accounting providers being more likely to explain the scope and the methodology 
employed during their work. Criteria are also referred in most cases (95.9%), but we 
did not find significant differences across providers (p > 0.10). On the other hand, the 
level of assurance present significant differences (p < 0.01), with accounting providers 
being more likely than other providers to declare the level applied (100% vs. 40%). 




level or a combination of both levels (20%). Accountants mostly apply the 
limited/moderate level (88.2%), while non-accounting providers apply specially a 
reasonable/high level or a combination of both levels (66.7%). Thus, the type of 
provider is significantly associated with the level of assurance (p < 0.05). In the same 
way, standards also involve significant differences across assurors (p < 0.01) with 
accounting providers being more likely than other providers to mention the standard 
used (97.1% vs. 60%). Moreover, if we focus on assurors that employ the ISAE 3000 
and/or the AA1000AS, we found significant differences (p < 0.01), with accountants 
more likely to employ the ISAE 3000 (88.2%) and non-accountants more likely to use 
the AA1000AS (66.7%). The concept of materiality appears in 77.6% of assurance 
statements, and is more usual among accounting providers (94.1%) than among other 
providers (40%). These differences are significantly associated with the type of 
provider (p < 0.01), with accountants being more likely to mention this item in their 
assurance statements. About inclusivity, only 5.9% of accountants refer to this concept 
compared to 53.3% of non-accountants, which entails significant differences (p < 0.01), 
with accountants being less likely to mention this item. In the same way, 5.9% of 
accountants refer to responsiveness in comparison to 33.3% of non-accountants, 
which involves significant differences (p < 0.05), with accountants being less likely to 
mention this concept. As regards the conclusions, 83.7% consist in a general opinion, 
while 16.3% consist in a detailed opinion. If we differentiate by type of provider, 94% of 
accountants express their conclusion in a general way and 5.9% in a detailed way, 
while 60% of non-accountants express a general opinion and 40% a detailed opinion. 
In this case, differences are significant (p < 0.01) in the way that accounting providers 
are more likely to express a more general conclusion, while non-accounting providers 
explain their opinion in detail. Finally, 34.7% of assurance statements include 




(46.7%) than among accountants (29.4%), but these differences are not significantly 
associated with the type of provider (p > 0.10). 
Table 7 
 
4.3. Quality of assurance statements 
With regard to the quality of assurance statements, results in Table 8 show an 
average total quality of 16.89 points, reaching the highest level 23 points, while the 
lowest level remains at 7 points. At country-level, organisations from shareholder-
oriented countries get a higher average quality (23.33 points), than those from 
stakeholder-oriented countries (16.54 points). At sector-level, the highest average 
result is for the most sensitive sectors with 18.15 points, while for less sensitive sectors 
the average quality reaches 16.03 points. Regarding assurors, the assurance 
statements produced by accountants have an average quality higher than those 
produced by non-accountants (17.44 versus 15.67 points, respectively). 
Table 9 summarises the multiple regression model results. According to the R-
square, the independent variables as a whole explain 75.92% of the dependent 
variable variance, once adjusted by the number of dependent variables; the explained 
variance is 73.12% (adjusted R-square). These results show an important explanatory 
power of the model. Size is significantly related to the quality of assurance statements 
(p < 0.01) so that, firms with a higher turnover have assurance statements with a 
higher quality (beta ≈ 6.53). Due to the negative interaction, when the assuror is an 
accountant the “effect size” of size is lower (beta ≈ 1.084 ≈ 6.53 - 5.445), but is 
positive. The quality significantly depends on the sector (p < 0.01), with a higher level 
of quality in most sensitive sectors (beta≈6.85, when assuror is a non-accountant). 
Moreover, there is a relationship between assurors and quality of the assurance 
statements (p < 0.01), with accountants getting a higher quality opposed to non-




accountant, due to the negative interaction the “effect size” is lower than the addition of 
the individual effects (beta ≈ 14.91 ≈ 6.85 + 12.58 - 4.52). Finally, country resulted no 
significant and was dropped from the model. 
Table 9 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Throughout this research we have tried to show what is the pattern of CSR 
reporting and assurance among the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations. We 
analysed whether adoption of reporting and assurance, and choice of assuror were 
associated with organisation size, country and sector, as posited by the existing 
literature in this area. In addition, we assessed the quality of assurance statements and 
we analysed whether this quality depended on size, country, sector and type of 
assurance provider. 
It is paradoxical that, despite their social features and being a supportive 
environment for CSR, big cooperative and mutual organisations resorted less to CSR 
reporting than big corporations. During our study period, 8% of the top cooperative and 
mutual organisations produce CSR reports following GRI guidelines, which represents 
a low percentage compared to 81% for G250 companies and could show a different 
behaviour of cooperatives regarding CSR reporting3. On the other hand, it seems that 
they are engaged in conferring credibility to the information disclosed. Thus, 52% of 
reports were externally assured, which came closer to the 59% for G250 companies, 
and it indicates no different behaviour regarding assurance when comparing with G250 
companies4. 
                                                     
3 We performed a Pearson Chi-squared test resulting in significant differences (p-value < 0.000), but caution should be 
taken because of differences in size and other variables could explain in part the different behaviour. 




To answer our first research question, we can affirm that the decision to issue a 
GRI report is significantly associated with the organisation size, country and sector. 
Specifically, the likelihood of adopting CSR reporting in accordance with GRI guidelines 
is higher for the largest cooperative and mutual organisations. This result is consistent 
with findings obtained by Hackston and Milne (1996), Adams et al. (1998), Archel 
(2003), Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Brammer and Pavelin (2008), Kent and Monem 
(2008), Castelo and Lima (2008), Reverte (2009), Simnett et al. (2009), Amran and 
Haniffa (2011), Zorio et al. (2013), Thorne et al. (2014) and García-Sánchez et al. 
(2015), furthermore, we found a non-linear relationship where the positive effect of size 
decreases. We think that non-linear relationships have not been sufficiently explored by 
the literature. In accordance with Simnett et al. (2009) and García-Sánchez et al. 
(2015), we found that organisations domiciled in stakeholder-oriented (civil law) 
countries are more likely to adopt CSR reporting than those from shareholder-oriented 
countries. Similar to Hackston and Milne (1996), Archel (2003), Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006), Castelo and Lima (2008), Reverte (2009) and Simnett et al. (2009), our results 
also indicate that organisations from more sensitive sectors are more likely to issue 
GRI reports than those from less sensitive sectors. According to these results, we can 
conclude that the top cooperative and mutual organisations’ decision to issue a GRI 
report could be explained by the legitimacy theory, since large organisations with high 
environmental and/or social impacts are more visible to the public and, as a 
consequence, disclose more information about their CSR (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; 
Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Castelo and Lima 2008; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; 
Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015). In addition, institutional theory is helpful in order to 
explain the decision of issuing a CSR report, since companies domiciled in civil law 
countries, and operating in more sensitive sectors are of interest to different 
stakeholders and, thus, they tend to provide leadership in CSR reporting, or to emulate 




As regards the second research question, our results reveal that adoption of 
assurance is significantly associated with country and sector. In line with Simnett et al. 
(2009), Kolk and Perego (2010) and Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017), we 
found that the organisations from stakeholder-oriented (civil law) countries are more 
likely to assure their CSR reports than those from shareholder-oriented countries. 
Opposite to Simnett et al. (2009), Cho et al. (2014), Sierra et al. (2014) and Martínez-
Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017), who revealed that adoption of assurance was 
more frequent in more sensitive sectors, our results indicate that this practice is more 
common in less sensitive sectors. This seems a counterintuitive result and more 
empirical evidence over time is necessary to reach more consistent conclusions. Unlike 
Simnett et al. (2009), Sierra et al. (2013, 2014), Zorio et al. (2013), Castelo et al. 
(2014), Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015), Gillet (2015) and Martínez-Ferrero and García-
Sánchez (2017), but as in Kolk and Perego (2010) and Cho et al. (2014), we did not 
find a significant association between adoption of assurance and organisation size. In 
this sense, it seems that the decision to assure a CSR report does not have a 
legitimated purpose, since assurance does not depend on the organisation size and it 
is more likely among less sensitive sectors. In addition, this decision could be also 
explained by the institutional theory, since organisations from determined countries are 
more engaged to CSR assurance, and it responds to institutional policies that exert a 
pressure, which influenced the behaviour of organisations towards these practices, as 
pointed out Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015). 
In response to our third research question, findings show a significant association 
between assuror and the organisation size. Consistent with Simnett et al. (2009), Kolk 
and Perego (2010) and Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015), we found that the largest 
organisations prefer accountants as assurance providers. In contrast to Simnett et al. 
(2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010), there is no evidence that choice of assuror is 




choice of assuror and sector, which differs to Sierra et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013) 
and Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2015). Preference by accountants could be justified by the 
perception that this type of providers offers a higher quality (Mock et al., 2013). Perego 
(2009), Zorio et al. (2013) and Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. (2015) stated that quality 
is higher when the assurance provider is an accountant. Moreover, they represent a 
point of strength in involving experts from various disciplines and in consulting a wide 
public of stakeholders (Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012). 
In relation to the fourth research question, we found that assurance statements 
differ in content and format across assurors, as stated Deegan et al. (2006a, b). 
Accounting providers are more likely to identify addressee, that in all cases is internal 
to reporting organisations. Consistent with Deegan et al. (2006a, b), addressing 
assurance statements to internal stakeholders may have implications for the 
independence of assurors as it might be expected that independence would be lower 
where the addressees are involved in the management of the organisation, instead of 
being external. Moreover, this evidence might point to the existence of managerial and 
professional capture, which might lead to attributing only residual materiality to 
stakeholder interests (Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012). Most of the assurance services 
provided a limited/moderate level of assurance instead of a reasonable/high level. This 
could be due to the nature of the case, the lack of appropriate criteria or standards, 
considerations of cost/benefit, the lack of proper evidence and the needs of users 
(Hasan et al., 2005).  According to O’Dwyer and Owen (2005), Mock et al. (2007, 2013) 
and Perego and Kolk (2012), results indicate that accountants apply a more 
conservative, cautious and limited approach to provide low levels of assurance, while 
non-accountants apply a more evaluative approach and provide higher levels. 
Accountants are hesitant to draw clear and precise conclusions from the assurance 
engagement given the uncertainties surrounding the domain of sustainability assurance 




combination of different guidelines, it seems that accountants are hesitant to report on 
compliance and provide high levels of assurance (Perego and Kolk, 2012). Opposite to 
O’Dwyer and Owen (2005), but in line with Deegan et al. (2006a, b) and Mock et al. 
(2007, 2013), the research shows that accountants indicate standards with more 
frequency, which is due, in part, to the guidance that has been generated by the 
accounting profession in relation to financial statement audits and assurance 
engagements (Deegan et al., 2006a, b). Accountants are more likely to use the ISAE 
3000, which is not surprising given that this standard stem from an international 
auditing body (Pergo and Kolk, 2012). In contrast, non-accountants employ mainly the 
AA1000AS. Accounting providers are more likely to express a more general 
conclusion, while non-accounting providers explain their opinion in detail. As pointed 
out O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) and Perego and Kolk (2012), there is a lack of 
information in terms of stakeholder inclusivity and responsiveness. Moreover, we found 
a lack of observations and recommendations, although according to Manetti and 
Becatti (2009), provision of recommendations is a negative aspect, since the aim of the 
assurance services should be only express a professional opinion on the reliability of 
the information reported in the CSR report, refraining from giving advices to the 
management. 
Finally, in response to the fifth research question, we found evidence that 
organisation size is significantly associated with quality of assurance statements, 
whereby large organisations are more likely to get a higher level of quality, which 
agrees the findings of Zorio et al. (2013), Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2012) and Romero et 
al. (2010). In agreement with Perego and Kolk (2012), but against Zorio et al. (2013), 
our findings reveal that sector is significantly related to the level of quality, with more 
sensitive sectors more likely to get a higher quality. The type of assurance provider 
affects the quality of assurance reports, with accountants getting a higher quality 




Fernández-Feijóo et al. (2012), Romero et al. (2010) and Perego (2009). The model 
exhibits that size and type of assuror interacts, the (positive) effect size of size is lower 
when the assuror is an accountant. As well, sector and type of assuror negatively 
interacts, therefore the effects of sector and type of assuror depend each other, when 
the sector is sensitive and the type of assuror is accountant the joint effect is less than 
the addition of the main effects of sector, when this is less sensitive, and assuror, when 
this is non-accountant. The model highlights the complexity and contingency of 
relationships across variables. Finally, in contrast to Perego and Kolk (2012), country 
has not a significant effect and was dropped from the final model. 
This is a pioneering research work that contributes to the CSR reporting and 
assurance areas analysing these practices from the cooperatives perspective, and 
therefore, it also contributes to the cooperatives research area. As practical 
implications, investing in CSR reporting is a way to get legitimacy among stakeholders, 
to enhance the reputation and to gain competitive advantage. In the current situation, 
disclosing information about CSR could help to reinforce the trust and credibility. In this 
way, the relationship between cooperatives and CSR may represent a valuable asset 
for business development only if these organisations are able to provide greater 
credibility and trust in society and if there is an effective dialogue with stakeholders 
(Bollas-Araya et al. 2014). According to ICA (2013), CSR is not a concept that is 
universally associated with cooperatives. The goal is to position cooperatives as 
builders of CSR. The cooperative sector needs to convincingly demonstrate that CSR 
is in the intrinsic nature of cooperatives, and that these organisations make a positive 
contribution to CSR in three senses: economic, social and environmental. Therefore, 
these organisations should use their social nature to more actively include CSR 
reporting among their practices and to lead this practice because, according to their 
principles and values, CSR is an integral part thereof. But, nowadays, cooperatives 




tweaked’ frameworks. So, CSR reporting standards and frameworks should be 
developed considering the special characteristics of cooperatives. One option is to 
adapt an existing framework to ensure comparability and tweak it at the edges to reflect 
the cooperative nature of the enterprise. The second alternative is to develop a specific 
framework for cooperatives that reflects the cooperative way of doing business 
(Herbert et al. 2016). 
It should be noted that the results from this research have a number of limitations. 
First, the sample size is quite small, since very few cooperative and mutual 
organisations issue a CSR report following the GRI guidelines. Results can only be 
generalised to the top 300 cooperative and mutual organisations. Hence, we cannot 
extrapolate them to all cooperative and mutual organisations in the world. Moreover, 
we focus in GRI-based reports, when some organisations publish CSR reports based 
in other standards. 
As a final point, we propose as future research lines the analysis of other 
determinants that could influence the decision of adopting CSR reporting and 
assurance, as well as choice of assurors and quality of assurance statements. It would 
be interesting to interview companies about their CSR reporting and assurance 
practices to know their motivations, benefits and barriers to issue and to assure CSR 
reports. In line with previous studies, we also propose to conduct a survey to obtain the 
opinion of stakeholders with regards to CSR reporting and assurance processes. 
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Table 1. Cooperative principles and CSR principles 
Cooperative principles CSR (European Commission) 
1. Voluntary and open membership Voluntary nature of CSR 
2. Democratic member control  
3. Member economic participation  
4. Autonomy and independence  
5. Education, training and information 
Credibility and transparency of CSR practices 
Attention to specific needs of SMEs 
Balanced and all-encompassing approach to CSR, including 
economic, social and environmental issues as well as consumer 
interests 
6. Cooperation among cooperatives  
7. Concern for community 
Focus on activities where Community involvement adds value 
Support and compatibility with existing international agreements 
and instruments 





















Table 2. Sample description 
  Observations GRI reports Assurance statements 
Size  n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Turnover  1200 7.2001 96 10.6276 52 11.8542 
Country  n % n % n % 
Argentina Stakeholder 1 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Australia Shareholder 12 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Austria Stakeholder 14 1.2 3 3.1 3 5.8 
Belgium Stakeholder 23 1.9 1 1.0 1 1.9 
Brazil Stakeholder 17 1.4 2 2.1 1 1.9 
Canada Shareholder 40 3.3 7 7.3 0 0.0 
Colombia Stakeholder 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Czech Republic Stakeholder 1 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Denmark Stakeholder 35 2.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Finland Stakeholder 43 3.6 7 7.3 3 5.8 
France Stakeholder 159 13.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Germany Stakeholder 135 11.3 12 12.5 7 13.5 
India Shareholder 4 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Ireland Shareholder 9 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Italy Stakeholder 60 5.0 4 4.2 4 7.7 
Japan Stakeholder 73 6.1 1 1.0 0 0.0 
Netherlands Stakeholder 57 4.8 24 25.0 13 25.0 
New Zealand Shareholder 21 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Norway Stakeholder 28 2.3 4 4.2 2 3.8 
Republic of Korea Stakeholder 4 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia  - 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Singapore Shareholder 9 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
South Korea Stakeholder 4 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Spain Stakeholder 32 2.7 8 8.3 8 15.4 
Sweden Stakeholder 24 2.0 8 8.3 4 7.7 
Switzerland Stakeholder 34 2.8 8 8.3 2 3.8 
United Kingdom Shareholder 35 2.9 7 7.3 4 7.7 
United States Shareholder 322 26.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sector  n % n % n % 
Agriculture and food More sensitive 338 28.2 32 33.3 11 21.2 
Banking and financial services More sensitive 56 4.7 14 14.6 7 13.5 




Industry and utilities More sensitive 42 3.5 4 4.2 4 7.7 
Insurance and mutual companies Less sensitive 493 41.1 29 30.2 20 38.5 
Wholesale and retail Less sensitive 240 20.0 17 17.7 10 19.2 
Other Less sensitive 14 1.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  1200 100.0 96 100.0 52 100.0 
 
Table 3. Descriptive analysis 
 GRI report Assurance  Assurors 
 Otherwise GRI Not assured Assured Non-accountants Accountants 
Size n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Ln(Turnover) 1104 1.3493 96 1.9142 52 1.9908 44 1.8236 17 1.6376 35 2.1623 
Country n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Shareholder 438 96.9 14 3.1 4 28.6 10 71.4 4 100.0 0 0.0 
Stakeholder 664 89.0 82 11.0 48 58.5 34 41.5 13 27.1 35 72.9 
Sector n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Less sensitive 701 93.8 46 6.2 30 65.2 16 34.8 8 26.7 22 73.3 
More sensitive 403 89.0 50 11.0 22 44.0 28 56.0 9 40.9 13 59.1 



















Table 4. Analysis of determinants of adoption of CSR reporting 
Variables in the equation B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Ln(Turnover) 2.082 0.472 19.458 1 0.000* 8.023 
Ln(Turnover)2 -0.364 0.109 11.246 1 0.001* 0.695 
Country 
(Reference: Shareholder) 1.245 0.300 17.259 1 0.000* 3.472 
Sector 
(Reference: Less sensitive) 0.708 0.222 10.173 1 0.001* 2.029 
Constant -3.825 0.462 68.469 1 0.000* 0.022 
Chi-square = 74.591; p = 0.000* 
-2 log likelihood = 594.122 
Cox and Snell R-square = 0.060 
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.141 
Hosmer and Lemeshow: Chi-square = 12.181; p = 0.143 
Area under the curve (ROC): 0.755 
Overall percentage (cut point: 0.50) = 92% 
Overall percentage (cut point: 0.15) = 83% 
Specificity (cut point: 0.15) = 86.39% 
Sensitivity (cut point: 0.15) = 43.75% 




















Table 5. Analysis of determinants of adoption of assurance 
Variables in the equation B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Ln(Turnover) 0.078 0.260 0.090 1 0.765 1.081 
Country 
(Reference: Shareholder) 1.830 0.693 6.982 1 0.008* 0.160 
Sector 
(Reference: Less sensitive) -1.223 0.502 5.941 1 0.015** 3.398 
Constant -0.886 0.857 1.071 1 0.301 0.412 
Chi-square= 12.358; p = 0.006* 
-2 log likelihood = 120.059 
Cox and Snell R-square = 0.121 
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.161 
Hosmer and Lemeshow: Chi-square = 12.730; p = 0.121 
Area under the curve (ROC): 0.6823 
Overall percentage (cut point: 0.5) = 63.5% 
Specificity (cut point: 0.50) = 79.55% 
Sensitivity (cut point: 0.50) = 50% 




















Table 6. Analysis of determinants of choice of assuror 
Variables in the equation B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Ln(Turnover) 1.515 0.598 6.420 1 0.011** 4.549 
Country 
(Reference: Shareholder) 25.027 20046.800 0.000 1 0.999 0.000 
Sector 
(Reference: Less sensitive) -1.141 0.774 2.173 1 0.140 3.131 
Constant -1.951 1.004 3.773 1 0.052*** 0.142 
Chi-square = 23.193; p = 0.000* 
-2 log likelihood = 42.533 
Cox and Snell R-square = 0.360 
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.502 
Hosmer y Lemeshow: Chi-square = 13.389; p = 0.099 
Area under the curve (ROC): 0.884 
Overall percentage (cut point: 0.5) = 76.9% 
Specificity (cut point: 0.50) = 52.94% 
Sensitivity (cut point: 0.50) = 88.57% 




















Table 7. Analysis of differences in assurance statements across assurors 
 Non-accountant Accountant Total Chi-square 
 n % n % n % value p-value 
Title 15 100.0 34 100.0 49 100.0 - - 
Name of assuror 15 100.0 34 100.0 49 100.0 - - 
Date 15 100.0 34 100.0 49 100.0 - - 
Location of assuror 6 40.0 9 26.5 15 30.6 0.897 0.502 
Addressee 3 20.0 33 97.1 36 73.5 31.708 0.000* 
Internal / ‘the readers’ 1 33.3 33 100.0 34 94.4 
23.294 0.005* 
Stakeholders 2 66.7 0 0.0 2 5.6 
Responsibilities of reporter 11 73.3 32 94.1 43 87.8 4.184 0.062*** 
Responsibilities of assuror 11 73.3 34 100.0 45 91.8 9.873 0.006* 
Independence 11 73.3 24 70.6 35 71.4 0.038 1.000 
Impartiality 9 60.0 24 70.6 33 67.3 0.531 0.520 
Competences 10 66.7 17 50.0 27 55.1 1.169 0.280 
Scope 11 73.3 34 100.0 45 91.8 9.873 0.006* 
Level of assurance 6 40.0 34 100.0 40 81.6 24.990 0.000* 
Limited 2 33.3 30 88.2 32 80.0 
9.608 0.010* 
Reasonable / Combination 4 66.7 4 11.8 8 20.0 
Criteria 15 100.0 32 94.1 47 95.9 0.920 1.000 
Standards 9 60.0 33 97.1 42 85.7 11.674 0.002* 
Other 3 33.3 16 48.5 19 45.2 
0.655 0.477 
ISAE 3000 / AA100AS 6 66.7 17 51.5 23 54.8 
ISAE 3000 2 33.3 15 88.2 17 73.9 
6.933 0.021** 
AA1000AS 4 66.7 2 11.8 6 26.1 
Summary of work 11 73.3 34 100.0 45 91.8 9.873 0.006* 
Materiality 4 40.0 32 94.1 38 77.6 17.509 0.000*   
Inclusivity 8 53.3 2 5.9 10 20.4 14.428 0.000* 
Responsiveness 5 33.3 2 5.9 7 14.3 6.405 0.022** 
Conclusion 15 100.0 34 100.0 49 100.0 - - 
General opinion 9 60.0 32 94.1 41 83.7 
8.869 0.007* 
Detailed opinion 6 40.0 2 5.9 8 16.3 
Observations/ 
recommendations 7 46.7 10 29.4 17 34.7 1.368 0.331 







Table 8. Analysis of determinants of quality of assurance statements 
Quality * Size n Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ln(turnover) - - - - - 
Total 49 16.89 4.011 7 23 
Quality * Country n Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Shareholder 3 23.33 0.577 22 23 
Stakeholder 46 16.54 3.879 7 23 
Total 49 16.89 4.011 7 23 
Quality * Sector n Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Less sensitive 29 16.03 4.468 7 23 
More sensitive 20 18.15 2.906 14 23 
Total 49 16.89 4.011 7 23 
Quality * Assuror n Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Non-accountant 15 15.67 6.298 7 23 
Accountant 34 17.44 2.364 12 22 














































Variables in the equation B S.E. t Sig. 
(Intercept) 1.6424      1.4241    1.153 0.2551 
Ln(Turnover) 6.5288      0.6499 10.046 0.000* 
Sector 6.8479      1.1150    6.142 0.000* 
Assuror 12.5824      1.7461    7.206 0.000* 
Ln(Turnover)* Assuror -5.4447 0.7526 -7.235 0.000* 
Sector * Assuror -4.5193 1.3562 -3.332 0.002* 
Multiple R-square = 0.7592 
Adjusted R-square = 0.7312  
F = 27.11; p = 0.000 
Durbin-Watson = 1.1983 




Table 10. Codebook for the content analysis 
Items  Scale (total 26 points) 








Addressee is internal or ‘‘the readers’’ 
Stakeholder are mentioned in the addressee 
Name of assuror 0 1 
No reference 
Reference 
Location of assuror 0 1 
No reference 
Reference 
Report date 0 1 
No reference 
Reference 
Responsibilities of reporter 0 1 
No reference 
Reference 
Responsibilities of assuror 0 1 
No reference 
Reference 
Independence of assuror 




Independence statement or reference to an ethic code 





Impartiality statement or reference to an ethic code 
Competences of assuror 0 1 
No reference 
Competences statement or reference to an ethic code 












Not applicable or no reference 
All issues were assured to a limited/moderate level 
Selected issues were assured to a reasonable/high level, and 
others to a limited/moderate level 
All issues were assured to a reasonable/high level 
Criteria used to assess 







Reference to publicly unavailable criteria 
Reference to publicly available criteria (GRI, internally developed 
criteria published in the report…) 





Reference to publicly unavailable criteria 
Reference to publicly available criteria (AA1000AS, ISAE 3000) 






Materiality 0 1 
No reference 
Reference to materiality or AccountAbility Principles 
Inclusivity 0 1 
No reference 


















Statement does not include observations/recommendations 
Statement includes observations/recommendations 
 
